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Introduction: better men

Men made the Empire, according to countless stories consumed by
late Victorian and Edwardian readers, and, according to other stories just
as numerous, the Empire made men. The divergent emphases of these
two propositions suggest a muddled reaction to the range of doubts that
stories of men and Empire were called upon to relieve: could the strained
and far-flung Empire, increasingly beset by powerful economic and
military rivals, be preserved by Britain's stout, manly spirit? Or was it
that the men of a degenerate metropole required a stiff dose of the frontier
to scour off the accumulated weaknesses of an over-civilized life? The
confusion of the causal priority of manliness and Empire , however, does
not diminish the significance of a broader cultural conviction that the two
were mutually constitutive , that they made and reaffirmed each other.
This book examines a wide range of accounts of the exploits of British
heroes across real and imagined frontiers, but it is ultimately concerned
with a broader story of ideological change. Its real subject, in other words,
is not men and Empire but the ideas of masculinity and imperialism,
and the cultural synthesis they achieved between 1870 and 1914. The
historical specificity of this frame is crucial, not only because the connections between masculinity and imperialism were more pronounced at
this time than ever before, but also because new understandings of each
of these ideologies were consolidated during the same period. By the
late nineteenth century, the standard of manliness was carried by new
champions; paragons of midcentury manliness, such as the entrepreneur ,
the missionary, and the affectionate family man, had been elbowed aside
by the untamed frontiersman, the impetuous boy, and the unapologetically violent soldier. Imperialism, meanwhile, rose to the center of popular
consciousness just as its political justifications were fundamentally transformed . Emerging arguments about the meaning of manhood and
the purpose of Empire turned to each other for cultural authority, and
popular literature, which was undergoing changes of its own, mediated
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the combination and disseminated to a wide and enthusiastic audience
new fantasies of an imperialist masculinity.
Reflecting ruefully on these cultural transformations, Charles Masterman, Liberal journalist and soon to be MP for West Ham North, blamed
the work of popular writers. These "Apostles of the New Imperialism" had
successfully contrived a great betrayal of the literary mission: "Literature,
after its long alliance with the party of reform, had deliberately deserted to
the enemy." 1 Midcentury literature, Masterman argues, had been cosmopolitan, humanitarian, progressive - in a word, liberal. The new literature,
by contrast, was above all imperialist, and imperialist in a "frankly Tory"
way, one which "branded Liberalism as but a gigantic fraud by which the
weak deluded the strong." 2 Not long ago, sanguine liberals had imagined
an end to war, a brotherhood of nations united by trade, and the radiation
of the "sweet reasonableness of the English character" across the globe.
Now, bloodthirsry reactionaries "clamoured for the ancient Barbarism;
and delighted in war; and would spread English civilization, not by a
diffusion of its ideas but by the destruction of its enemies."3 It was not
even dear, Masterman goes on, that the values literature had come to
embrace were English at all. If at some moments the New Imperialists
crowed about English supremacy, at others they "neglected and despised
the ancient pieties of an older England, the little isle set in its silver sea.
Greatness became bigness; specific national feeling parochial."4
Masterman writes with the hyperbole of a frustrated partisan, but
there is considerable substance behind his generalization about literature's
turn to the aggressive, illiberal politics of the New Imperialism. The
popular genres examined in this book, including pirate stories, military
adventures, mummy tales, and lost-world fiction, all captured the imagination of enormous readerships and asked them to identify with heroes
transformed by encounters with a vast, exotic, and savage world. Civilized
England, as many of their protagonists thought, seemed narrow and dull
by comparison. And though the point is only hinted at in Masterman's
critique, much of this literature was also explicitly and self-consciously
masculine. Aimed at a readership of men and boys, these stories centered
on interactions between male characters; women - especially British
women - were driven to the narrative margins, leaving questions of
masculine identity to be decided by relations between and within male
groups rather than by reference to feminine virtues. The new conventions
of popular literature, moreover, emerged in the context of the romance
revival of the 1880s, itself a highly gendered rejection of what were thought
to be enervating feminine themes of contemporary realism and its delicate,
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over-refined studies of character. In place of these, masculine romance
would offer imaginative and exhilarating yarns that would speak to what
Andrew Lang called "the savage within us," and "the old barbarian under
our clothes." 5 Lang's claim that popular romances spoke to an abiding
savagery in male nature corroborates Masterman's point that literature had
abandoned progressive themes and "clamoured for the ancient Barbarism,"
but it also raises one of the most intriguing and overlooked dimensions
of the New Imperialist masculinity: the extent to which it was articulated
around images of foreign men - even non-white, uncivilized colonial
subjects - as exemplars of proper manliness.6
Restlessly searching for aspirational models of better men, the New
Imperialists often turned their eyes abroad, even to the enemies they
confronted and the peoples they had conquered. If we are surprised by
the diversity of places in which they claimed to discover such men, it may
be because our expectations have been conditioned by the axioms of
postcolonial cultural criticism. One of the most central of these, after
all, has been the thesis that the Western imperial imagination is founded
on the imperative to differentiate unconditionally between colonizers and
their subjects, and thus to produce justificatory stereotypes about colonized peoples - their violent barbarism, their irresponsible childishness,
their superstitious ignorance - that emphasized their distance from the
civilized nations who were thereby entitled to rule them. In light of this
thesis, the many counterexamples examined in this book pose a fascinating
conundrum: at the very moment of Britain's greatest colonial power, the
zenith of its cultural arrogance and racial chauvinism, the Empire was
bolstered by fantasies of a manhood that transcends the distinctions of
border and breed. Why is it that relationships between men, even if only
imaginary, could function as an exception to the imperial rule? Through
an analysis of popular literature aimed at men and boys, I show that the
same stereotypes that had been used to denigrate the colonial Other were
adapted by late Victorian and Edwardian men to crystallize new masculine
ideals and give form to emerging cultural desires that were unrepresentable
in the images of manhood they inherited from their fathers. The exotic
barbarian was held up to male audiences as a figure with whom they had
much in common, and who might therefore hold the keys to both a
reinvigorated individual life and an empire made fierce enough to withstand the pressures of late nineteenth-century geopolitics.
The phrase "better men" reverberates through the wide range of popular
texts considered in this book, appearing so frequently, I will suggest,
because it promised an answer to urgent questions about the ideals of
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masculinity and the global networks of power that shaped it. The note was
struck most famously by Rudyard Kipling, Masterman's chief example of
the literary "Apostles of the New Imperialism." Kipling's memorable line
"You're a better man than I am, Gunga Din," provocatively recognizes
superior masculine qualities in a foreigner who would once have been
easily derided. The following chapters will explore many variations on this
theme, beginning with an explication of "Gunga Din." I will argue that
the force of Kipling's line for his contemporaries depends on a profound
reorientation of the very notion of better manhood, one promoted by
changing imperial politics: where early and mid-Victorian ideals of masculinity emphasized narratives of personal development (I am a better man
than I was), later imperialist stories stressed continual competition (I am a
better man than he is). This agonistic model could imagine putatively savage
peoples as important players in a perpetual masculine contest, and not only
as the opponents of British men but also as their counterparts or guides.
At the same time, the dream of unceasing competition between men could
naturalize and support the increasingly aggressivevalues that characterized
the politics of imperialism from the 1870s to the First World War.
Asked to describe the Victorian ideal of manhood, most of us would
probably conjure an image from the middle of the nineteenth century,
say, 1860 or so: an earnest, mature, hard-working, morally upright paterfamilias, frock-coated and (in that decade) full-bearded. The prominence
of this type represents the triumph of decades of ideological work through
which middle-class values, drawing on liberal economics and evangelical
seriousness, supplanted the older and increasingly disreputable image
of gentry masculinity while appropriating and reworking some of its terms
of approbation, such as gentlemanliness and chivalry.7 The middle-class
hero of midcentury, unlike his gentry predecessor, could make a virtue of
trade and commerce, and - especially after the exhortations of muscular
Christianity 8 - join in the strenuous crusade of social transformation. But
his chief struggle was moral and internal. As both Herbert Sussman and
James Eli Adams have shown, the master value of midcentury manliness
was self-discipline, the ability to resist temptation and channel the springs
of male energy to laudable ends. This inward drama was popularly staged
as a narrative of moral maturation (as in David Copperfield's eventual
mastery of his "undisciplined hean") 9 whereby a liberal developmental
ideal of self-culture steered the natural impulses of boyhood into a carefully
regulated manliness. No other challenge a man faced mattered more
than this primary struggle for moral self-discipline: "the highest virtue,"
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as Samuel Smiles advised, was "the victory over ourselves."1 ° Charles
Kingsley's similar point suggests how the manliness of self-discipline could
be used in an imperial context to differentiate English virtue from the
behavior of unmanly savages:"To be bold against the enemy is common to
the brutes; but the prerogative of a man is to be bold against himself."11
The same quality of self-discipline used by Malthus to distinguish civilization from barbarity had become a means of defining manliness against
the primal competitiveness of the savage.
Self-mastery was the close corollary of another key masculine ideal,
autonomy, which was itself an affirmation of liberal individualism over
the old aristocracy's hierarchical network of obligations, patronage, and
deference. Yet for all his isolating independence, the manly struggler
against himself was at least allowed the support of his domestic circle.
The importance of family relationships to masculine identity has long
been obscured by the inertia behind the stereotype of separate spheres,
the starkly gendered division between masculine public activity and
the feminine sanctuary of the household. But as we have been reminded
by such influential histories as Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall's
Family Fortunes and John Tosh's A Man's Place, domestic life in its
real and idealized forms was a central pillar of middle-class masculine
identity. As Tosh puts it, "The Victorian ideal of domesticity was in all
respects the creation of men as much as women. 'Woman's sphere' was a
convenient shorthand, not a call to exclusivity."12 The comfortable
household signified not only a man's success as a breadwinner, but also
a haven in which his manly character could be bolstered by the moral
influence of his wife or expressed through his divinely sanctioned authority, as when he led the household in prayer. Domesticity thus offered
men profound pleasures of its own: "only at home could a man be truly
and authentically himself. While the workplace and the city crippled
his moral sense and disturbed his human relationships, home gave play
to feelings of nurture, love and companionship, as well as 'natural' forms
of authority and deference; it nourished the whole man."' 3 The domestic
ideal framed interpretations of the Empire as well, so that the civilizing
mission was often represented as an effort to reproduce its gender
norms overseas. Thus British outrage over the Sepoy "Mutiny" in
1857 was fanned by accounts that emphasized its assault on domesticity.
The Indian rebels who had violated British homes and murdered women
and children were unmanly, but Henry Havelock, the great masculine
hero of the Mutiny's suppression, was celebrated as a man of "warm
domestic sympathies. "14
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What became of our ideal man of 1860? Scholarly investigations
of gender and sexuality during the later Victorian and Edwardian periods
have been engrossed by rebellions against the norm: aesthetes and decadents, sexual dissidents of all sorts, the New Woman and, more recently,
her counterpart, the New Man. The powerful insights of this scholarship,
however, have overshadowed another vital part of the story, which is
that masculine norms were themselves in flux. Several independent lines
of evidence point to an erosion of the midcentury ideal. David Newsome,
for instance, notes the decline of the principle of moral maturity in the
late nineteenth century: the sense that boys could hardly be hurried into
adulthood quickly enough gave way to a version of manliness that hardly
cared "to make boys into men at all."15 J. A. Mangan's work on the games
ethic, meanwhile, shows that while athleticism rose rapidly to cultural
prominence, it also departed from its earlier goals, enshrining a manliness
that had less to do with moral character than aggressive competition. 16
John Mackenzie charts the rise of new popular exemplars of masculinity
during the same period; where Smiles had celebrated the engineer, entrepreneur, and missionary, later generations were enthralled by the hunter
and, especially from the 1870s on, by the imperial soldier.17 Tosh, meanwhile, argues that the 1870s were the beginning of an even more telling
transformation, which he calls "the flight from domesticity": wearied of
domestic pleasures and worried by emerging forms of women's authority,
increasing numbers of men rejected or postponed marriage, finding their
satisfactions instead within groups of male peers in homosocial institutions
such as the club, the athletic organization, or the military.18 All of these
developments, along with others described later in this book, converge
during the late nineteenth century in the consolidation of what we might
call- with some caution - a new hegemonic masculinity.
The analytic frame of hegemonic masculinity that informs this study
derives from the work of the sociologist Raewyn Connell, who uses the
term to distinguish a society's most authoritative construction of masculinity from other subordinated or marginalized models with which it
coexists: "At any given time," she argues, "one form of masculinity rather
than others is culturally exalted."19 Connell's approach is not without its
critics, who point out that to select one cluster of masculine values as
hegemonic can oversimplify the diverse range of other contemporary ideals
as well as the even more intricate interactions between possible gendei;
configurations in the experience of individual lives.20 Yet Connell' s framework remains valuable at the level of cultural analysis because it challenges
us to understand how some masculine models enjoy a privileged

Introduction:bettermen

7

relationship to institutional power, and thus exercise enormous influence
over the lives of men and women whether they accept those models or not.
At the same time, Connell's concept implies the fragility and contingency
of a dominant model - any hegemonic masculinity stands uneasily at a
moment between the configuration it has displaced and that which will
displace it - and so spurs us toward a more historically nuanced analysis
than, say, the uncomplicated alignment of masculine identities with social
class. Connell's framework is helpful for the purposes of this book, moreover, because it highlights the power of an idealized masculinity, even when
the kinds of activity promoted by the ideal are unavailable to the men
who consent to it. Before the First World War, only a fraction of Victorian
and Edwardian men had any direct experience of military or colonial life,
much less of the rowdy voyages of colonial adventure fiction, but popular
audiences found the dream of imperial masculinity no less compelling.
Outside the relatively few studies that have taken it as their particular
focus, the conventional scholarly wisdom about imperial manliness has
been content to point to a few of its most conspicuous traits - its
militarism, its hostility to feminine influence, and its fascination with
the powerful male body - and declare the period to be an age of
"hypermasculinity." Yet that term misleadingly implies that the effect of
the Empire was merely to intensify and exaggerate masculine values
that already existed (or, more misleadingly still, that exist always and
everywhere). In fact, just as the New Imperialism was not merely an
escalation of earlier political commitments but a seismic revision of the
Empire's purpose, so too was imperial masculinity marked by its readiness
to reject earlier masculine values. The record of popular literature allows us
to trace the displacement of these older forms and follow the ideological
ramifications of imperialist masculinity to important new insights. It can
show us, for instance, that fantasies of all-male communities subordinated
not only the mid-Victorians' cherished domesticity, but also their belief
that a man's most important struggle was against the standards of his own
conscience. Judgments of the male group superseded the self-scrutiny of
moral improvement, and shame surpassed guilt as the paramount mode of
male anxiety. Discipline turned outward, too, from the internal struggle
for self-mastery to a collective mode of discipline epitomized by the
military, or to the individual resistance to external hardships prized by
the growing emphasis on masculine endurance. At the same time, instinct
and spontaneity could be valued over painstaking deliberation, and
impulse and irrationality taken for passionate male authenticity . Transcendent principles or universal laws came to be less appealing than
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malleable rules that enabled ludic, amoral contests of cleverness and guile.
Above--all, popular literature can show us that transvalued stereotypes of
savagery became potent symbols of masculine possibilities, so that atavism
could be imagined as a sign of strength rather than weakness, exoticism as
one of virility rather than effeminacy, and the relapse into barbarism as an
empowering fantasy rather than a paralyzing anxiety. "Hypermasculinity"
scarcely does justice to these richly complicated and often contradictory
aspects of manliness, nor does it help us to see how thoroughly consistent
they were with the new demands of imperial politics.
By the 1870s, England was already the center of a vast Empire, but in the four
decades preceding the First World War it set its bounds wider still and wider.
Among the many new protectorates, colonies, and annexations during this
period we might list the Gold Coast (1874), Cyprus (1878), Egypt (1882),
North Borneo (1882),Upper Burma (1888),British East Africa (1888),Southern Rhodesia (1889), Kuwait (1899), Sudan (1899), and the several colonies
and conquered regions that were ultimately federated as South Africa in 1910.
All told, the territory added to the Empire in these decades amounted to
some forty times the area of today's United Kingdom. Even as the Empire
expanded, however, it faced new challenges from other empires that were
consolidating and widening their own spheres of economic, political, and
military influence. The alarmingly swift defeat of the French in the
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) marked not only the rise of a powerful
German Empire but also the beginning of intense imperial rivalries,
European contests for resources and prestige that were decided in distant
terrains of Africa and the Pacific. The many little wars, diplomatic negotiations, and innovations in legislation and colonial administration that
refashioned the British Empire during this period cannot be adequately
sketched in this book, which provides only enough background to allow
readers to follow specific arguments as they relate to particular instances
of colonial domination and imperial rivalry; readers who wish to learn
more about the events discussed in this book- such as the Sepoy Rebellion,
the Royal Titles Act, the occupation of Egypt and campaigns in the
Sudan, or the Second Boer War - can, I hope, readily find overviews in
widely available sources. In the following few pages, I want to emphasize
a different kind of context, a background essential for the broader arguments of this study, but one that is possibly less familiar and certainly less
accessible than the lists of battles and bills. The context that requires
elaboration is the momentous turn in British attitudes about the import
and mission of the Empire.
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The 1870s, pivotal years in the history of masculinity, also saw the birth of
what would later be called the New Imperialism. Historians have disagreed
about the precise definition of this term, its explanatory value, and even
the boundaries of the period to which it should be applied, so it is necessary
21
to clarify how the term will be used here. By the "New Imperialism" I mean
the cultural conviction, rooted in political discourse but broadly diffused
through the media of popular culture, that the Empire was the source and
proofofBritain's glory. In a period ofintensifying rivalry with other emerging
imperial powers, the Empire would be the bulwark of British prestige and
global influence, so that close bonds with the colonies of white settlement
required careful fostering, while control over non-white colonial dependencies had to be jealously maintained. It is in relation to these core beliefs rather than to any coherent set of colonial policies or fits of territorial
acquisition - that we can plausibly speak of the New Imperialism as the
culturally ascendant ideology of empire from its emergence during the
great political debates of the 1870s until its collapse on the battlefields of
the First World War. To analyze its impact on Victorian and Edwardian
popular culture, however, we must attend not only to the central convictions
of the New Imperialism, but also to the nimbus of qualities and attitudes with
which it became associated. These included, first of all,a frankly competitive
spirit, demonstrated by an aggressive assertion of national prestige against
threats from rivals and a militant readiness to defend or expand its influence
(from the late 1870s, the more feverish demotic eruptions of this spirit would
be called jingoism). Moreover, in its fixation on prestige, the New Imperialist
ethos was attentive to appearances, attracted to the performative and even
theatrical dimensions of power, enamored by spectacle, ceremonial pomp,
and the bold symbolic stroke. Where the gesture failed, it was prepared to
turn to naked force, and it intensely appreciated the military vinues. It was
deeply concerned with honor, but less patient with the prohibitions of law,
religion, and morality; to its proponents, this emphasis could be read as a
pragmatic and realistic defense of British interests within the complex game
of imperial powers, but to its enemies it seemed opportunistic, unprincipled,
and Machiavellian. All these attitudes, as I shall argue over the course of
this book, became attached in various degrees and combinations to popular
representations of manhood. To clarify these broad strokes, we ought to begin
with an individual man with whom all of these qualities were associated,
Benjamin Disraeli, whose persona and policies were the chief inspiration
for the New Imperialism, and who was enshrined in the years after his death
as its symbolic champion. To appreciate the novelty of Disraeli's influence,
however, we must take a step further back to his great rival, William
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Gladstone, who became just as potent a symbol of liberal imperialism as
Disraeli became of the ideology that eclipsed it.
In the most important midcentury statement of his position on the
Empire, "Our Colonies" (1855),Gladstone argues that the global extension
of European power since the seventeenth century had been undertaken
for all the wrong reasons. The colonization of the Americas, for example,
had been driven by an irrational "love of gold" despite the claims of some
colonists to have been motivated by the impulse to spread the word of God:
''the history of the European civilisation in the West is a history of anything
other than the propagation of the gospel."22 Other material justifications for
colonization had been similarly misguided. Those who sought to enhance
the revenue of their mother countries, especially by establishing exclusive
trading relationships, were blind to the truth later revealed by liberal political
economists that only free, open, and_mutually beneficial trading partnerships
could effectively create wealth. Those who wanted to seize new lands
had yielded to an even more pernicious impulse, since the "lust and love
of territory have been among the greatest curses of mankind." Gladstone
also attacks the motive of prestige: though he allows that the reputation
of an imperial state might usefully augment its "moral influence, power and
grandeur," it ought only to follow incidentally from an otherwise admirable
colonial program rather than from a vain desire to "make a show in the
world." 23 Having repudiated this array of imperial motives as unsound
and unsavory, Gladstone asks, "Why then are colonies desirable?"24 He
offers two answers. The first is material: colonization can open previously
untapped resources and develop new markets, and so increase global trade.
Yet because he does not believe that a colonial market should be fettered by
any protected relationship with its metropole, it is ultimately valuable only as
another market, not as a colonial market per se. Colonization is economically beneficial because it produces trade, not because it produces colonies.
More interesting is Gladstone's other reason for expansion: "the moral
and social results which a wise system of colonisation is calculated to
produce. "25 The English state should be moved to establish colonies, he
argues, only by the same beneficent urge that prompts English people
to have children. The increase of population augments the power and
stability of a nation, and is a universal moral blessing insofar as it multiplies
the number of people living under conditions of decency and justice:
We think that our country is a country blessed with laws and a constitution
that are eminently beneficial to mankind, and if so, what can be more to be
desired than that we should have the means of reproducing in different
portions of the globe something as like as may be to that country which we
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honour and revere? I think it is in a work by Mr. Roebuck that the
expression is used, "that the object of colonisation is the creation of so
many happy Englands." It is the reproduction of the image and likeness of
England - the reproduction of a country in which liberty is reconciled with
order, in which ancient institutions stand in harmony wirh popular freedom, and a full recognition of popular rights, and in which religion and law
have found one of their most favoured homes. 26

Gladstone's claim that the reproduction of Englishness throughout
the world would morally profit humanity places him - just as much as his
advocacy of free trade - squarely within a liberal tradition of imperialism.
The seeds of this philosophical tradition, according to Uday Singh Mehta,
can be found in Locke, and its fruition in the later work of Bentham,
Macaulay, and the Mills. In its pursuit of universal truths and its understanding of human progress as a general movement toward those truths, Mehta
contends, British liberalism ironically sought to reproduce what was already
familiar. Foreign peoples, like unfamiliar territories, were to be remodeled
along English lines, transformed into so many happy Englishmen through
a process justified by paternalistic metaphors of tutelage and kinship.2 7
This civilizing mission, as it came to be known, would yield its full moral
harvest when colonies could assume their own governance and deal with
other states as free and rational agents in their own right. Gladstone emphasizes that self-governance is the only defensible terminus in the colonial
journey, that the best relationships between states - even former colonies must be free and voluntary, and that sympathy, rather than formal political
ties, was the only desirable basis for such relationships. The story of progress
toward autonomy promised by the liberal narrative of the civilizing mission
was later so hypocritically mouthed in colonial discourse that it is easy to
forget the extent to which some liberals took it seriously; it was Gladstone's
dogged support for Irish Home Rule, for instance, that fractured the Liberal
pany and cemented the dominance of the New Imperialism. 28
For Disraeli, by contrast, the imperial project implied no narrative
of dissolution; the paramount duty conferred on the British by their
Empire was to keep it. In his Crystal Palace speech of 1872 - venerated
by the end of the century as the talismanic proclamation by which
Conservatives had claimed the imperial mantle - Disraeli warned his
audience against the Liberal threat: "If you look to the history of this
country since the advent of Liberalism - fony years ago - you will find that
there has been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much
energy, and carried on with so much ability and acumen, as the attempts
of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire of England. "29

12

Masculinity and the New Imperialism

In response to this menace, Disraeli announces that the Conservatives are
dedicated to "the maintenance of the Empire." The possession of colonies
is an end in itself, the "great object of the Tory party," rather than a font
of wealth or an instrument of human progress. The colonies are not to
be preserved for their own benefit - except perhaps incidentally - but as
a "source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land." 30 But
Disraeli's most insistent argument, the one to which he returns in his
peroration, is his appeal to English pride. He frames the diverging paths of
Liberal and Conservative principles as a choice between meekly accepting
mediocrity within a pack of European states, on the one hand, or, on the
other, asserting English greatness for all the world to see:
The issue is not a mean one. It is whether you will be content to be a
comfortable England, modelled and moulded upon Continental principles
and meeting in due course an inevitable face, or whether you will be a great
country, -an Imperial country- a country where your sons, when they rise,
rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of their
countrymen, but command the respect of the world.3'

The motive force behind Disraeli's imperial vision, in other words, is the
competitive pursuit of prestige that Gladstone had denounced. National
greatness becomes contingent on the maintenance of the Empire, which
allows not only for strength and happiness but also for the agonistic
pleasures of a rise, individually and nationally, to "paramount positions,"
for the gratification of commanding "esteem" and "respect."
Under this banner of imperial prestige, Disraeli offers all men of the
recently enlarged electorate a chance to rally in a contest for lasting glory,
both collectively in the ongoing rivalry of European powers and individually in a domestic political battle that is already underway. "Upon you
depends the issue," he warns. "You must act as if everything depended on
your individual effons."32 These two levels of struggle are fused together by
an explicit appeal to competitive manliness. The "sons" of his auditors will
be the beneficiaries of an empire maintained, while, more immediately, the
threat of Liberal and continental principles represents a test of their manly
resolve: "Yes, I tell all who are here present that there is a responsibility
which you have incurred to-day, and which you must meet like men." Part
of this responsibility, he goes on, is to recruit others to answer the masculine
challenge: "Make each man feelhow much rests on his own exertions."33
The ongoing masculinization of the imperial mission, already hinted at
in Disraeli's famous exhortation, will be explored through the remainder
of this book. Before moving forward, however, I want to emphasize two
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related developments that will reappear in later chapters. The first is the
marginalization of morality - often, but not exclusively, Christian
morality - in New Imperialist discourse. The personal contrast between
the dour Gladstone and the flamboyant Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield after
1876) promoted the view that the latter's vision had more to do with
seeming great than doing right. So too did the perceptions of Disraeli's
second administration, especiallyduring the crisis surrounding the Eastern
Question (1876-78). His apparent nonchalance toward the slaughter of
Bulgarian Christians by the Turks, and his subsequent policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire as a buffer against Russian expansion, looked like
proof that morality did not enter into Disraeli's calculations of British
interests. So, at any rate, argued Gladstone repeatedly during the righteous
barnstorming of his Midlothian campaign. Gladstone's towering moral
dudgeon - coming as it did from a figure conspicuous for his pious
rectitude - contributed to the sense that this new "imperialism" (or
"Beaconsfieldism," as he called it) was defined by its contrast to a Liberal
foreign policy grounded in moral principle. Gladstone's attack may have
helped him back to power in the short run, but over time his principles
were associated with what imperialists regarded as proof of his weakness,
especially after the ignominious end of the First Boer War in 1881and the
martyrdom of Gordon at Khartoum in 1885.His belief that colonies should
be preserved only for the right reasons could be interpreted as readiness to
abandon the Empire altogether, just as Disraeli had warned. As The Times
put it, "'Imperialism' was a word invented to stamp Lord Beaconsfield's
supposed designs with popular reprobation. But the weapon wounded the
hand that wielded it, and a suspicion was engendered, which seriously
injured the Liberal cause, that Liberalism was in some sort an antithesis
of Imperialism."34 But if Gladstone's crusade had linked Liberalism with
anti-imperialism in public opinion, other prominent Liberals, such as
Edward Dicey and James Fitzjames Stephen, had already joined the
New Imperialist consensus that England's greatness depended on the
maintenance of the Empire, and that this political fact required no moral
defense. Dicey, defending expediency over principle, frankly admitted "the
difficulty of reconciling the existence of our Empire, or of any Empire
supported by force, with the doctrines of the Sermon on the Mount. "35
The second pertinent development is the declining appeal of the civilizing mission, which had been the narrative corollary to the Empire's
moral duty. The belief that colonization was a story of progress had
been crucial to liberal imperialism, both as an expression of its ultimate
humanitarian purpose and as a justification for the inapplicability of
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universal principles to those peoples who were not yet prepared to enter
into the sisterhood of nations. Yet faith in the possibility of civilizing
subject races was broadly eroding by the later decades of the nineteenth
century, and not only in Britain. As Andrew Porter summarizes, "There is
no doubt at all that from mid-century the general outlook of Europeans
rapidly became more critically dismissive of other societies, doubtful of
non-European capacity for change and progress, and far more readily
insistent on their own objectives and inclinations." 36 Porter suggests
that the shift was abetted primarily by the rise of scientific racism, which
implied that non-Europeans were naturally unable to adapt to European
cultural models: "Once superiority of culture was linked to that of race, a
different morality began to influence the practice of European expansion.
Assimilation of European and non-European came to seem less desirable
and perhaps impossible." 37 In the case of Britain, the waning appeal of
the civilizing mission was punctuated by a series of crises - the Sepoy
Rebellion of 1857, the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865, the Ilbert Bill
controversy of 1883- that convinced many Britons that the elevation of
their subject races, at least within any foreseeable future, was sentimental
nonsense and unsound policy. By the end of the century, invocations of
the old rhetoric of the civilizing mission tended to describe the extension
or consolidation of British authority rather than the transformation
of natives; it meant the effort to supply order, health, and infrastructural
improvements to peoples who could not, and could probably never be
trusted to, provide for themselves. In this way the relatively static ideal
of maintenance displaced the liberal telos of progress, leaving the story of
the Empire as a picaresque tale in which adventures multiplied without
ever concluding. As the colonial secretary, Lord Crewe, explained to the
House of Lords in 1909, "What will be the future of India fifty, sixty, or
a hundred years hence need not, I think, trouble us."38 It was not only
as though (as John Seeley had famously joked) the Empire had been
acquired in a fit of absence of mind, but also that it was to be retained
in an absence of purpose.
Still, we should not assume, as did many anti-imperialists, that the drift
away from the rhetoric of high moral purpose or the grand narrative of the
civilizing mission led to an intoxicated anarchy of principles. Instead,
the culture of the New Imperialism produced its own range of images,
idioms, and ethical frameworks that could make sense of Britain's global
relationships and articulate new narratives of its history and destiny. This,
as I shall argue, is why emerging constructions of masculinity played so
vital a role. An emphasis on the competitive dimensions of manliness - as
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derived, for instance, from discourses of honor, gamesmanship, or military
codes - provided conceptual templates through which the aggressive
ideologies of the New Imperialism could be understood and valued.
Moreover, insofar as competitive impulses could be represented as inherently
male, masculinity could naturalize international rivalries and conflicts, and
also challenge the manhood of dissenters. This emphasis on a naturally
competitive manliness, rather than on the developmental ideals of midcentury manhood, also underwrote a sense of history in which struggle was
constant and never-ending.
Pressed into the service of a New Imperialist vision of global order,
representations of the nature of manhood betray signs of new anxieties
that became characteristic of this period: the worry, for instance, about
the debilitating influence of civilization on manly character, and the
heightened sense of vulnerability to shame - both national and individual in the eyes of male competitors . Yet they also reveal ironies that considerably complicate the ramifications of New Imperialist identities. For
example, even though Disraeli had painted Gladstone's platform as
cosmopolitan and his own as national, in many ways Gladstone's liberal
imperialism had depended more on notions of Englishness than its
successor. Gladstone had contended that English greatness was rooted in
England itself, which is why the independence of the colonies posed no
threat. But for the New Imperialists, the Empire was integral to English
identity and to its status relative to other nations; the Empire, and the men
who made it, were therefore necessarily defined in comparative and adversarial terms, and the standards of comparison had to be transnational
rather than insular. Hence the masculinity that undergirded the Empire
was less self-sufficiently English or even civilized, and more intent on
looking abroad for standards of a global manliness. Thus we arrive at a
second remarkable irony: just as imperial discourse was increasingly
authorized by hardening taxonomies of racial difference, it could look to
other races for symbols of masculine vinue. The very simplicity of stereotypes that reduced whole races to a few essential qualities made men of
those races imaginatively available as emblems of character, in some cases as
the epitomes of manly traits wonh admiring or emulating. Though some
races were routinely regarded as effeminate or weak, others were represented
as naturally warlike (e.g., Zulus, Sikhs, and Pathans), fearless (Sudanese
Dervishes), loyal (Gurkhas), or honorable (Arabs and Japanese). 39
Amid the uncenainties left by the decline of developmental models
of masculine vinue, such racial stereotypes stood in as benchmarks of
manliness by which British men might measure themselves. And to the
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extent that racial qualities were understood as essential and unchanging,
foreign men could signify masculine standards undiminished by the
decadence of modern civilization. They represented a purer masculinity
of the past, one linked to the nation's glorious history or to the uncorrupted impulses of boyhood. This association of boys, foreigners, and the
men of Britain's past was noted with alarm by Gladstone, who objected
to the rising emphasis on honor in imperialist discourse as a disturbing
anachronism:
Men talk as if we were free to fight, as a Scotch lord would fight in
Edinburgh three centuries ago for the centre of the causeway;or as a boy
fought at Eton in my time to determine whether he could or could not 'lick'
another boy; or as in Ireland, at a fair, shillelahswere flourished, and heads
cruelly mauled and broken, for the simple preference of one name to
another, or for the pleasure of that excitement which fighting brings. If
we are to revive, in the present daylight, the levities of childhood, the
manners of a semi-barbarousage, or the excessespardonable in an overdriven people, it is high time to take heed and to make some inquiry
concerning the paths of honour and of shame.40
For champions of progress like Gladstone, the celebration of competitive
and potentially violent styles of honor was a horrifying atavism, a derangement of the narratives on which masculine maturity and English civilization
were predicated. Yet New Imperialists traced precisely these connections
between boyhood, history, and the colonies to construct normative
models of manliness, concurring with Gladstone's premise but reversing
his conclusion. Hence a final irony in the debates over imperial ideals that
simmered through the popular press from the 1870s on: while critics of
the New Imperialism charged their opponents with embracing a resurgence
of barbarous attitudes, accusing them of thinking like savages on the
frontier, the advocates of the emerging imperial masculinity - especially in
the fantasies of popular literature - were strikingly inclined to agree.
The ironies I have sketched here are examined more closely in the first
two chapters, which together introduce the broad themes of New Imperialist notions of manliness and their complicated relationship to stereotypes
of non-European masculinities. Chapter I concerns the reconstitution
of better manhood, showing that the thrust of normative masculinity
was reoriented from the midcentury priority of personal development to
its late-century preoccupation with international competition. The key
texts here are Kipling's patriotic poems - the genre to which he turned
when he wanted to influence popular opinion most directly - which
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demonstrate how conceptions of honor (including Kipling's own twist
on masculine abjection) reframed male experience in the service of a global
struggle for prestige. The second chapter complements this analysis by
turning to the increasingly common examples of English men whose heroic
glamour was expressed through cultural cross-dressing;that is, through their
assumption of foreign clothing as a means of appropriating signs of exotic
manliness. Investigating stories by A. E. W. Mason, G. A. Henty, and
Kipling, I argue that the frequency of the trope in this period indicates the
acute awareness of the performative dimensions of masculinity demanded
by the pursuit of prestige, and that it expressed fantasies of an unusual form
of hybridity that bolstered new strategies of colonial authority.
Chapters 3 and 4 consider representations of boyhood that overturned
mid-Victorian conceptions of masculine development. Chapter J explores
one of the favorite figures of the New Imperialist imagination - the boy
who never grows up - in light of the turn from liberal, progressive
narratives toward the principle of imperial maintenance. Focusing particularly on fiction that pairs boys with pirates, I argue that together these
figures naturalize an ethos of competitive play, which operated outside
structures of conventional morality and international law but which
offered in their place new sets of rules by which imperialism could be
appreciated as a satisfying game of global adventure. Continuing to analyze
changing ideas of maturation, Chapter 4 discusses the quasi-scientific
discovery of a natural affinity between boys and savages. I chart the
emergence of new attitudes about this connection in stories about public
schools, the most celebrated incubators of manly character. Reading
Thomas Hughes's Tom Brown's SchoolDays and Kipling's Stalky & Co.
as allegories of distinct models of colonial authority, I show how the
New Imperialism recognized the usefulness of the savage boy, and how
the Empire, once the would-be schoolmaster to the world, now conceded
that it had much to learn from other men.
In the final three chapters, I turn from disrupted narratives of individual
development to the grander scale of historical change, showing that the
full of the liberal telos of global progress encouraged the wild anachronisms
of late Victorian and Edwardian popular fiction. Chapter 5 describes
the astonishing proliferation of stories of exotic lost worlds, focusing
particularly on contributions by Kipling, Rider Haggard, and Conan
Doyle, to show how Britons began to understand barbarism as an aspect
of manly character worth rediscovering. Chapter 6 investigates popular
mummy stories in relation to Britain's occupation of Egypt, arguing that
the themes and narrative structure of these stories reproduce the politics

18

Masculinity and the New Imperialism

of the "veiled Protectorate" and, more generally, Disraeli's ideal of maintenance. The mummy tale rewrites the political "Egyptian Question" as a love
stoty through which the Empire might wed itself to the timeless endurance
of Pharaonic splendor. The final chapter turns to the futures imagined in the
scientific romances of H. G. Wells, whose politics were decidedly opposed
to most of the writers considered here. Nevertheless, Wells's attempts to
imagine evolutionary progress toward a more rational future repeatedly
collapse into scenes of savage, two-fisted masculine violence. Meanwhile,
the epitomes of rationalism, including those liberals who advocated restraint
of bodily pleasure, are transformed in his fiction into sexless,macrocephalic
monsters. I argue that the failure even of a progressive like Wells to imagine
a future for masculinity demonstrates the hegemonic force of contemporary
assumptions about imperial manhood. Together, these three chapters
exhibit the fantastic timescapes of New Imperialist masculinity: its alluring
past, its static present, and its impossible future.
All of these chapters focus on popular literature, poems and stories that
were themselves widely read by contemporaries (as were the works of
Kipling, Stevenson, and Haggard) or that belonged to genres (such as
school stories, pirate tales, or lost-world adventures) that were enthusiastically received. Yet in this study, popularity itself is not an object of analysis
in the ways that imperialism and masculinity are. Rather, popular literature
constitutes the domain from which I have chosen my examples, the group
of texts that collectively offer us the best chance to discern broad patterns
of cultural assumptions about imperial masculinity. Whatever the aesthetic
merits of these works, their reception offers us some measure - inescapably
limited though it may be - of the common aspirations and desires of the
many readers who responded to them so eagerly. These works shaped, and
were shaped by, the fantasies of an age, and they express those dreams
more freely and more intimately than do the discourses of politics or
science, and far more than the dispassionate record of actual events.
Though influenced by such discourses and events, popular literature is
also the product of the imagination - as are, in their different ways,
masculinity and the Empire itself - and so it is with popular literature
that we can begin to understand what it meant to be a better man in the
age of the New Imperialism.

